Paradox security ru

paradox security ru

Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping. Available at Medvedev, D. (). Known for being an innovative research and development company, Paradox is a recognized worldwide force in the security industry. E-mail: [email protected] Turkey, on the other hand, has its own security interests that call for a weaker Kurdish presence on the. BLUEDESIRE Documenting the sakila. S etup Windows Environment We are have determined that of desktop environments. To use it, Software Work. It is very a number of from aws EC2 secure your network.

But it is hardly the kind of progress we wanted to be making. While poor societies may leapfrog ahead thanks to mobile money, distance health and education, and smart distributed energy infrastructure, this may be offset by the fact that they are regularly buffeted by the whims, emotions, and ambitions of tech superpowers that feel empowered to intervene in their lives on a low-cost basis.

These superpowers, without so much as the use of a single human on the ground, could devastate these poor societies, not to mention others in their weight class, via the Internet or autonomous robot armies deployed on land and in the sky. This is a looming threat in this new world: that the digital divide morphs into a kind of digital colonialism in which the tech haves, without much fear of meaningful retribution, feel empowered to impose their views and values on the tech have-nots.

The central reason for these contrasts has to do with a defining reality of the interconnected world, the world we are entering, in which essentially every human is part of a man-made system for the very first time. As illustrated by the revelations about the National Security Agency and the behavior of countries such as China and other authoritarian states that seek to control the Internet within their borders and administer it like any other of the domains over which they have sovereignty, big governments that are able to bring to bear the greatest capital, as well as technological and human resources, can gain even more disproportionate power in this new world.

Big companies, too, can gain in ways that give them absolutely extraordinary and previously unthinkable influence. Consider the companies with billions of users or those that control information or key technological monopolies or near monopolies. Who conceivably has the ability to influence more people: a major power, like the United Kingdom, or Google or Facebook?

The power that used to control the waves or the ones that dominate the airwaves and the mind share of today? With an economy in which the building blocks of wealth are bits and bytes rather than acres or vaults of gold, whoever is best able to monetize connections, capture intelligence, or create unique new forms of value or advantages wins.

Indeed, those who succeed are more likely to be those who have the means at multiple levels to gain the virtual high ground—the concentrations of data, the control over nodes and networks, the means to create the algorithms and codes that encrypt and destroy and create.

In our networked world, economic, political, social, and military power increasingly flow via the network. Thus, the terrain of the network—defined by infrastructure, regulations, concentration of valuable resources and capabilities—becomes as critical as was geographic terrain. In politics, security matters, and business, understanding that terrain and the new rules of power that pertain to it becomes especially important, as does understanding how component aspects or elements of the network impacting its speed, ease of use, security, etc.

But as the nature of exchanges on the network changes, another critical advantage will emerge: Those who master machine intelligence may gain significant power even as they are shifting significant power to the machines.

How they harness that machine power, or whether they do or do not, will be of crucial consequence. From a military-affairs perspective, the 20th century was the era of industrialized warfare. The 21st will be the era of network warfare and therefore increasingly the era of automated warfare. Setting aside hyperbole and simplistic visions is essential when planning for a future that is going to become dramatically different in many complex ways.

When threats and capabilities or opportunities and risks are assessed, however, we see that this is good practice not just because it really never pays to be simplistic or to fall for the hype, but because the new reality is that threats will come at all of us, faster than before, from all precincts of the network.

The revolution … breaks down hierarchies and creates new power structures. It amplifies the capacity to analyze, reduces reaction times to allow only for impulse and can be a tool for amplifying emotions or rationality. It cedes some state authority to markets, to transnational entities and to non-state actors and, as a consequence, produces political forces calling for the strengthening of the state.

It is the best tool for democrats and the best weapon for demagogues. I went on to say that, given all the contradictions, it was probably too early to assert what certainties would be associated with the then-budding revolution. The article came out six months before Google was founded, six years before Facebook, and nine before the iPhone. Now, nearly two decades later, there is one clear certainty: Contradictions are themselves an essential aspect of this new era and should inform us as we seek to command a virtual landscape, one that we have made but whose form keeps shifting and whose horizons we cannot see.

Many of the Shiite activists I spoke with idolized Nimr as an icon of resistance, but one who continually extolled the virtues of peaceful activism and dignity. His sentencing was a shocking act that thrust al-Awamiya onto the stage of broader regional tensions, triggering protests across the Shiite areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, condemnation from Iran and Hezbollah , and threats of retaliation by militant Shiite groups in Iraq and Bahrain.

Adding fuel to the fire, Sunni gunmen on Nov. Riyadh has pledged to counter the barbarity of the Islamic State and has warned that the terrorist group intends to incite sectarian conflict inside the kingdom. Yet in its own domestic policies, the Saudi government has institutionalized sectarianism in virtually every aspect of political, social, and economic life. To be sure, since the s, the Saudi government has made some relative progress in terms of infrastructural development of the Eastern Province, where Shiite villages and towns have historically lagged behind their Sunni neighbors in terms of government funding.

It allowed some degree of religious freedom for the exercise of Shiite rituals and practices. Perhaps one positive byproduct of the killings in recent months has been rare expressions of cross-sectarian unity by influential Sunni clerics , senior Saudi officials , and editorialists.

Some observers have gone so far as to predict that the tragedy marks a turning point, ushering in a new era of Sunni-Shiite harmony in the kingdom. It is an outlook that is implicitly countenanced by the royal family as a ruling strategy. The result is a pernicious, everyday sectarianism that afflicts ordinary citizens, especially in times of regional upheaval and heightened tensions with Iran. It is particularly disturbing that the leader of the assailants was purportedly a Saudi jihadi returnee from Iraq and Syria, whom Saudi authorities accuse of conducting the attack at the behest of the Islamic State.

Its ultimate origins are domestic -- and not confined to the fringe. Saudi commentators have been arguing that, whatever its excesses, the Islamic State at least has the virtue of being a Sunni buffe r against an expanding Shiite crescent. And in the aftermath of the al-Ahsa attack, scattered voices across Saudi Arabia -- from religious faculty to newspaper columnists -- tried to shift the blame back to Syria and Iran , with some even hinting that the Shiites themselves and their Iranian backers had orchestrated the attack.

This is the sort of deceitful discourse that creates fertile ground for violence and puts limits on lasting, cross-sectarian reforms. In recent months, there have been revealing indications of just how entrenched these limits are. Potential bridge-builders between Sunnis and Shiites have been subjected to increased pressure and prosecution. The tribulations of Mikhlif al-Shammari are Exhibit A in this crackdown. An outspoken Sunni writer and notable from a prominent tribe with both Sunni and Shiite branches, Shammari conducted outreach on behalf of Saudi Shiites -- attending Shiite sermons and funerals and defending Shiite clerics from attacks by Salafists -- which endeared him to Shiites and stoked the ire of Sunni conservatives.

On Nov. A day after the al-Ahsa killings, the Saudi minister of culture and information announced the shutdown of al-Wesal, an anti-Shiite satellite TV station that was widely despised by many Shiite activists I met. But less than a day later, the minister was sacked. The reasons for his dismissal are unknown, and several observers have ruled out any connection.

As of this writing, al-Wesal is still in operation and being received in Saudi Arabia. Both episodes show the dilemma that confronts more moderate wings of the Saudi royal family that may genuinely wish for a relaxation of the sectarian orthodoxy and the enactment of limited reforms, but must be mindful of the backlash from conservatives. The result is a delicate balancing act by the royals that results in frequent reversals and mixed signals to Shiites.

The sentencing of Nimr may have resulted from just such a calculus. Many Saudi observers and Western diplomats told me that the sentence is unlikely to be carried out and assume King Abdullah will issue a royal pardon at the eleventh hour. Tackling these root causes and moving toward a more pluralistic landscape in Saudi Arabia will be a generational struggle. It is one that is largely beyond the capacity of U.

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